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TO SECURE THESE (UNALIENABLE) RIGHTS
WALTER BERNS*

Although it may not be obvious from the title I have given
this paper, my concern here, like that of this symposium, is with
"the normative bases of the United States Constitution." This
program reflects a concern with, perhaps even an apprehension
concerning, the condition of the normative bases-which is to
say, the moral foundations-of the Constitution and, therefore,
of the Constitution itself. And our political prosperity is utterly
dependent upon the Constitution.
The Constitution of the United States is unique among the
world's written constitutions. To say nothing of its longevityover half of the other 157 have been written since 1974-we
alone are constituted by a constitution. Constituted by it in a way
that France, for example, is not constituted by the constitution
of the Fifth Republic. By which I mean, France is not France,
and the French are not French because of that constitution;
they are not what they are because of that constitution or any of
its predecessors. But we Americans are what we are because of
the Constitution and the principles it embodies. Without the
Constitution, we have nothing on which to rely-no history
that is not a constitutional history; except in certain effete
southern circles where the names of Jefferson Davis or John
Taylor of Caroline are memorialized, no heroes that are not
constitutional heroes (Washington, Hamilton, Lincoln,
Roosevelt, Kennedy, men who either framed the Constitution
or defended it or held office under it); no thought equivalent to
the thought of Pascal, Moliere, or Descartes, thought that
formed the character of Frenchmen but is independent of the
various French constitutions. No principles-at least, no American principles-other than those stated in the Declaration of
Independence and embodied in the Constitution. Destroy the
Constitution and we destroy those principles-and then what?
Are we Protestants? If so, what are we going to do with the
Catholics among us? Are we Christians? If so, what are we
going to do with theJews among us? Are weJudeo-Christians?
If so, what are we going to do with the Muslims among us? Are
*
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we whites? If so, what are we going to do with the blacks
among us? In short, what are we other than a nation, a people,
brought forth on this continent by "our fathers" four score and
seven years before 1863, in 1776, a nation conceived in liberty
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal
insofar as they are equally endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights. We are a nation that, in order to secure
those rights, in 1787 instituted the government of the United
States. What are we other than a people of this Constitution
founded on this foundation?
In one way or another-and not least of all because he was
willing to take the nation into what proved to be the worst of its
wars out of a concern for the vitality of its principles-Abraham
Lincoln insisted that we were a nation built on the Declaration.
Paradoxically, the truth of that "proposition," as Lincoln called
it at Gettysburg, was confirmed by Alexander H. Stephens, Lincoln's old friend who, without losing his respect for Lincoln,
became his political enemy. Speaking as Vice-President of the
so-called Confederate States of America, Stephens repudiated
the Declaration and went so far as to dissociate himself from
Thomas Jefferson, his fellow Southerner and its principal
author. "The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of
the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old
Constitution were," Stephens said, "that the enslavement of
the African was in violation of the laws of nature." That idea,
he said, was "fundamentally wrong," and he went on to point
out that his new (Confederate) government was founded not on
the principle of the equality of rights, but, rather, "upon
exactly the opposite idea ...; its foundations are laid, its corner stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal
to the white man."'
These words were spoken three weeks before the firing on
Fort Sumter and the beginning of the Civil War, but that fact
should not obscure the measure of agreement between Stephens and Lincoln. They agreed on the connection between
the Constitution and the Declaration and, therefore, the rights
of man. That is why they were willing to go to war over the
Constitution: Lincoln to defend and preserve it and Stephens
to destroy it. Fortunately for us, that dispute belongs to
history.
1. Alexander H. Stephens, speech at Savannah, Ga. (March 21, 1861),
reprinted in 1 THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS 44-49

(F. Moore ed. 1864).
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So, too, does the dispute as to whether blacks as well as
whites are men endowed with unalienable rights. The Dred
Scott decision broached that dispute legally; the Civil War, at
least, resolved it politically; and, the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment resolved it constitutionally. This marked
the only correct resolution. For, there is no respect in which all
men, except black men, are equal: they are not equally white,
equally British, equally intelligent, equally beautiful, equally
anything except in the possession of the rights of nature. And
if black men do not have rights, white men do not have rights;
and if white men have rights, black men have rights. This is
why Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, writing for the majority in
the Dred Scott case, effectively denied that black persons were
human persons.2 As usual, Lincoln saw clearly the implications
of that decision:
Now, when [by means of the Dred Scott decision], you
have succeeded in dehumanizing the Negro; when you
have put him down and made it forever impossible for
him to be but as the beasts of the field; when you have
extinguished his soul, and placed him where the ray of
hope is blown out in darkness like that which broods over
the spirits of the damned; are you quite sure the demon
which you have roused will not turn and rend you? What
constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and
independence?'
What, indeed, other than the equal possession of rights? For
an understanding of the Constitution we, like Lincoln, must
turn to its source: the Declaration of Independence where
those rights are delineated.
Who, then, is Nature's God, the god who is said to have
endowed us with our rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness: the old God or some new god, the Biblical God or
the god who reveals himself only in the order of the universe?
It makes a difference, a political difference.
What is meant by the laws of nature that entitled us to a
"separate and equal station" among the powers of the earth:
the natural law as understood by Thomas Aquinas 4 or the laws
2. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856).
3. Speech at Edwardsville, Ill. by Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 11, 1858),
reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 473 (R. Basler
ed. 1946).
4. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, Q. 94.
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6

5
of nature as understood by Thomas Hobbes andJohn Locke?
The difference is considerable.
What is meant by the motto, novus ordo seclorum (or new
order of the ages)? Forrest McDonald, who wrote a book
under that title,7 thinks it refers to the new political structure,
federalism, but the words were inscribed on the Great Seal of
the United States in 1782, well before our federal system was
devised. How new was this country, and how new were the
principles comprising its foundation? Knowing that would
help us to know what is meant by the rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness.
Clearly, America was (and is) the first new nation; the
founders said as much.
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have
been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend
for their political constitutions on accident and force.8
America's Constitution is the product of political science,
specifically, as we are told in The Federalist No. 9, a new and
improved "science of politics." A science of politics that makes
it possible for the first time in history to retain the "excellences
of republican government" and avoid its "imperfections," the
imperfections so vividly displayed by "the petty republics of
Greece and Rome." 9 A science of politics that has nothing to
say about civic education but, instead, employs new or perfected institutions-the separation or distribution of powers,
checks and balances, representation, an independent judiciary-to resolve the persistent political problems, institutions
that work only within the extended territory that is the United
States. And a science of politics that depends on merchants
and lawyers. And that is new.
Mechanics and manufacturers, or factory workers, we are
told in The Federalist No. 35, "know that the merchant is their
natural patron and friend; and they are aware, that however
great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good
5.

T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. 14.

6. J.
7.

LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, II, § 6.
F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS

OF THE CONSTITUTION 262 (1985).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
9. Id. No. 9, at 47-49 (A. Hamilton).
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sense, their interests can be more effectively promoted by the
merchant than by themselves."'" But that's only part of the
story. The merchant's way will be America's way because
"[t]he prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as
well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has
accordingly become a primary object of their political cares."'"
In fact, protecting the unequal faculties of acquiring property is
"the first object of [this new] government. ''12
How new? Here is Aristotle on merchants: "[I]n the state
which is best governed ... the citizens must not lead the life of
mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical
to virtue." Only if necessary, he says, should merchants be
allowed to vote and hold office, and then only if they can show
that they
had "retired from business for [the previous] ten
3
years." '
This new science of republican politics puts no limit on
consumption, and relies not on sumptuary laws but on lawyers.
As we know from the records of the Constitutional Convention,
this, too, was not an oversight. "Mr. Mason moved to enable
Congress 'to enact sumptuary laws.' No government," he said,
"can be maintained unless the manners [of the people] be
made consonant to it."' 4 Only three of the states present in
the Convention supported his motion. On September 13, four
days before the Convention concluded its business, out of his
concern with "the extravagance of our manners [and] the
excessive consumption of foreign superfluities," Mason tried
again, but nothing came of his effort.' 5 Instead, the framers
cast their lot with lawyers, a fact duly noted by Alexis de Tocqueville: "I hardly believe that nowadays a republic can hope
to survive unless the lawyers' influence over its affairs grows in
proportion to the power of the people."' 6
10. Id. No. 35, at 213 (A. Hamilton).
11. Id. No. 12, at 70 (A. Hamilton).
12. Id. No. 10, at 55 (A. Hamilton).
13. Aristotle, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1328 b35ff, at
1288; 1278 a25-6, at 1183 (R. McKeon ed. 1941).
14. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 344 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966).
15. Id. at 606.
16. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 266 (G. Lawrence &J.
Mayer trans. 1969). Here is Plato on lawyers:
And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and
disgraceful state of education than this, that not only artisans and
the meaner sort of people need the skill of first-rate physicians and
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This new science of republican politics eschews any effort
to avoid factionalism, or class warfare, by promoting a uniformity of interests, or ethnic or religious warfare, by restricting the
size of the country or controlling immigration. On the contrary, America was to be huge, occupying an "extensive territory; [ffor it cannot be believed that any form of representative
government could have succeeded within the narrow limits
occupied by the democracies of Greece."' 7 It was not to be
Sam Adams's "Christian Sparta," but a haven "for all sorts and
conditions of men."18
Our Constitution makes the President Commander and
Chief of the army and navy, and of the militias when called into
federal service, but does not require military service or training
of its citizens. Again, this was no oversight. Americans differ
sharply from the citizens of the "ancient republics of Greece,"
we are told in The Federalist No. 8:
The industrious habits of the people of the present day,
absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the
improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which
was the true condition of the people of those republics. 9
The Constitution facilitates private pursuits, with a view to private gains, not public pursuits or public spirit.
The Constitution forbids religious tests for office holders
and, as well, laws respecting an establishment of religion, but
guarantees its free exercise. A government instituted to secure
the rights to liberty and pursuit of happiness is required to
judges, but also those who would profess to have had a liberal
education.... Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.
Would you say "most," I replied, when you consider that there
is a further stage of evil in which a man is not only a life-long
litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or
defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his
litigiousness; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to
take every crooked turn, and wriggle out of the way ofjustice: and
all for what?-in order to gain small points not worth mentioning
.... Is not that still more disgraceful?
Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 405a, at 119-20 (The Modern Student's Library 1928).
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 413 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (E. Earle ed.
1941).

17.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 63, at 413 (A. Hamilton orJ. Madison) (E. Earle

ed. 1941).
18. Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay (Dec. 30, 1780), reprinted

in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 238 (H. Cushing ed. 1904).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 44 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
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guarantee free exercise; its authority does not extend to the
care of souls.
Here again, the framers were influenced by John Locke,
this time Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration: "The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for
the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests . .. [such as] life, liberty, health, and indolency of body;
and the possession of ...money, lands, houses, furniture, and
the like." 2 The whole jurisdiction of the magistrate, Locke
adds, "reaches only to these civil concernments ' 2 1 and not to
the condition of souls. "The care . . . of every man's soul
belongs unto himself."'2 2 Which is another way of saying that
each of us defines the happiness that he has a right to pursue.
And if, in doing this, he neglects the care of his soul? Locke
answers, so what? Except insofar as the condition of souls
affects behavior toward the "civil interests" of others, it is no
business of the magistrate. Or, in Jefferson's words, "[t]he
legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as
are injurious to others. "23
No classical republic could afford this sort of indifference
to the character of its citizens or, apparently, to be so unconcerned with the promotion of public spiritedness. What passes
for public spiritedness is respect for another's private interestsself-interest rightly understood, in Tocqueville's words. 24
Securing rights means securing private rights, the rights to life,
liberty, and a privately defined happiness. Those rights define
or describe a private sphere where government is forbidden to
enter, a sphere narrower in size and scope than that of the state
of nature, true, but far wider and far more extensive than that
of any previous political society. Again, when secured, the
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness describe a
private sphere greater in scope than any that had ever existed.
How are these rights secured? By surrendering certain
rights to a government of a certain sort. "Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is
equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted,
the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order
20.

J.

Locke, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 15 (M. Montouri rev.

ed. 1963) (1689).
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in 8
WORKS 400 (H. Washington ed. 1854).
24.

A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 525.
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to vest it with requisite powers. '"25 Surrender, or "cede," these
rights not, as Hobbes had it, to a Leviathan but, rather, following Locke's advice, to the legislative. In the state of nature and
under the law thereof, each of us is empowered to do whatever
he thinks necessary to preserve himself (and the rest of mankind); this power "he gives up to be regulated by Laws made by
the Society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the
rest of that Society shall require .... ,,26 In the state of nature
and under the law thereof, each of us is also empowered "to
punish the Crimes committed against that Law." ' 27 This right, or
this power, "he wholly gives up., 28 Gives it up, as Locke emphasizes time and again, to a commonwealth governed by "establish'd standing Laws, promulgated and known to the People, and
not by Extemporary Decrees; by indifferent and upright Judges,
who are to decide Controversies by those Laws; And to imploy
the force of the Community at home, only in the Execution of such
Laws .
2.9.""Where there is no law, Locke writes, there is no
liberty"0 (which is to say, security for private pursuits); and liberty is better secured under the laws of civil society than under
the law of nature which-in the absence of "a known and indiferent Judge" and the power to back and support his judgments-is
unenforceable or, at a minimum, is difficult to enforce. Knowing this, a rational man will exchange his natural liberty for civil
liberty. 3
There is safety-or security for unalienable rights-when
these other rights are ceded to the legislative, and if the legislative power is vested in an assembly whose members serve for
fixed terms and are subject to the laws they themselves enact,
and especially if the people give their consent to these laws
through representatives subject to their suffrage. Here is the
meaning of that slogan made famous during the American
Revolution, "no taxation without representation." In short,
safety is to be had by exchanging natural rights or powers for
the constitutional right to be represented in the process by
which the laws are made. And that process cannot be altered
without the consent of the people, which is to say, the majority.
In Locke's words, "[t]he Legislative neither must nor can transfer
25.

26.
Laslett
27.
28.
29.

THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (.Jay)

(E. Earle ed. 1941).

J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, II, § 129, at 352 (P.
ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (emphasis in original).
Id., § 128, at 352 (emphasis in original).
Id., § 130, at 353 (emphasis in original).
Id., § 131, at 353 (emphasis in original).

30.

See id., § 57, at 305-06.

31.

Id., § 125, at 351 (emphasis in original).
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the Power of making Laws to any Body else, or place it any where
but where the People have." 3 2 For example, they may not
transfer it to the bureaucracy--delegata potestas non potest delegari,
as Americans used to say when saying it might possibly have
had some effect-or to the judiciary.
However, not everyone can be represented in the law-making process because not everyone-for example, not the
Ayatollah Khomeini, not Charles I, not Oliver Cromwell, not
Meir Kahane or Yassir Arafat-is willing to accept the end of
representative government, which is limited government or
security for the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Not everyone is willing to let his neighbor alone.
Strictly speaking, causes cannot be represented, or what
Tocqueville would have called great causes, embodied in "great
parties." America, he said, was blessed by the absence of great
parties. 3 And that, too, was not by chance, not an oversight.
By separating church and state the framers excluded the sort of
great parties that had plagued the Europe with which they were
familiar and had given rise to civil war and revolution in seventeenth-century Britain-and had inspired Hobbes and Locke to
search for a remedy.
American politics would be characterized by "small" parties with interests that can be represented. "A landed interest,
a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, [and] many lesser interests. .

.

. The regulation of

these various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government." 4 America would be a commercial republic, and in it
the animosity of the old-fashioned religious factions, each pursuing a great cause, would be replaced by the peaceful competition of economic interests.
The right to be represented means the right to have one's
interests weighed in the making of the laws, interests that can
be regulated and accommodated because, ultimately, they are
not incompatible. Karl Marx to the contrary notwithstanding,
class struggle is not inevitable. There would be rich persons,
sure, but the American rich, unlike the rich of the past, would
have no interest in keeping the poor down. There would be
poor persons, but the American poor, unlike the poor of the
past, would have no interest in bringing down the rich, not if it
32. Id., § 142, at 363 (emphasis in original).
33. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 174-77.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
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required them to destroy the liberty that allowed the rich to
become rich and by which they hoped to become rich themselves. But causes, as I have defined them, cannot be accommodated because they are incompatible. To paraphrase Calvin
Coolidge, America's business is, on the whole, business, not
causes, and that, too, is not by chance.
To repeat: rights can be secured by surrendering some of
them in exchange for the right to be represented in the making
of the laws which, in our case, are made by constitutional
majorities. These majorities assembled from among the representatives of the people rather than from among the people
themselves. Will it work? Will this Constitution, this constitutional system, "establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty [not only to the framers and
their immediate posterity, but to succeeding generations of
Americans]"? 3 5 Will it work regardless of the sort of people we
are or become?
To judge from what they did in 1787, one might conclude
that the framers were confident that it would work. In The Federalist, they acknowledged the necessity of a virtuous citizenry"Republican government presupposes the existence of [virtue]
in a higher degree than any other form [of government],"" 6but as I indicated above, they left virtue unendowed. Their
Constitution is silent on the subject: nothing is said about education, the family, public service, moral qualifications to vote or
hold office, and the like. In fact, nothing whatever is said about
citizenship.
To judge from what they said, however, one would have to
conclude that they thought that something in addition to these
new scientific institutional arrangements were needed if free
government were to be preserved. "[V]irtue or morality is a
necessary spring of popular government," President Washington said in his Farewell Address, and whatever the case with
respect to "minds of peculiar structure," such as his own, presumably, "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that
national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."" 7 And here is Jefferson on the same subject: "[C]an the
liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed
35. U.S.
36. THE

CONST. preamble.

No. 55, at 365 (A. Hamilton orJ. Madison) (E. Earle
ed. 1941).
37. G. WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 5, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979).
FEDERALIST
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their only firm basis, a conviction in"the minds of the people
that these liberties are of the gift of God?" 3 8 But note the qualifications. Washington seems to exempt himself-and others
of minds of peculiar structure-from the necessity, and Jefferson says not that these liberties are of the gift of God, but that
the people should believe they are. 3 9
Jefferson's point was elaborated by his fellow Virginian, St.
George Tucker, in his widely read edition of Blackstone's Commentaries. (Read by lawyers who in turn made the laws.) What
is needed, Tucker wrote, is a "rational and liberal religion; a
religion founded on just notions of the Deity, as a Being who
regards equally every sincere worshipper, and by whom all are
alike favoured as far as they act up to the light they enjoy."'
In
other words, a god whose only command is, worship sincerely,
a command that can be obeyed by one of any religious persuasion. Go to the church of your choice, as our billboards say.
"It is," Tucker continues, "only this kind of religion that can
bless the world, or be an advantage to society."'"
But perhaps the framers relied on the states here, relied on
them to do what they had traditionally done-and what their
state constitutions did not, or did not yet, forbid them to doto promote public spiritedness or the habits appropriate to
republican citizenship. I have in mind here the kind of laws
Tocqueville speaks of: sumptuary laws, or laws "concerned
with the maintenance of good behavior and sound mores in
society."" 2 If not the sort of laws adopted by the democratic
legislatures of seventeenth-century New England-Tocqueville
mentions laws punishing blasphemy, adultery, sorcery, idleness, drunkenness, impiety43-then, at least, their modern
equivalents. Such laws were still in effect in the late eighteenth
38. Jefferson, supra note 23, at 404.
39. This raises the following question: can the people hold this opinion
when they are told that it is useful that they hold it? Especially when, with

respect to this subject, they have a constitutional right to hold any opinion
they choose?
40.

2

G.

TUCKER,

BLACKSTONE'S

COMMENTARIES:

WITH

NOTES

OF

REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED

STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 9

(Rothman

Reprints 1969) (Philadelphia 1803).
41. Id. One is reminded of the Roman situation as described by Gibbon
in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: "The various modes of worship
which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people, as
equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as
equally useful." 1 E. GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE,
ch. 2, at 34 (H. Milman ed. 1883).
42. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 42.
43. Id. at 41-42.
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century-for example, laws having to do with the family and
the relations between generations-and, as I say, perhaps the
framers relied on the states to retain and enforce them. But
whether they did or not became irrelevant by an event-judicial
intervention in the legislative process-arising out of the framers' failure to resolve the slavery question.
Originally, blacks were governed, but they were not represented in the law-making process and, consequently, were not
part of the constitutional majorities that made the laws. Stated
otherwise, they were deprived of their right to be represented
with the consequence that their interests were not weighed in
the fashioning of the laws. They were not part of the people of
the United States.
This, presumably, was changed by the fourteenth amendment which, in its second section, promises to punish the states
that continued to deprive them of their right to be represented.
But that provision has never been enforced;4 4 it was not until
1965 and the passage of the Voting Rights Act that Congress
became serious about the "right of any citizen of the United
States [regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude] to vote." 4 5 But, in the meantime, the Supreme Court had
intervened to do what the Congress had failed to do.
What the Court did was to create rights-the right to vote
in primary elections,4 6 the right to attend nonsegregated public
schools,4 7 and so forth. Then, inspired by the success attending these decisions, it began to create rights of every description-for example, the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy48-and itfailed by a single vote to create a right of
homosexual sodomy. 4 9 We have become a society ridden with
judicially-created rights.
This has consequences that ought to concern us. Whereas
the framers intended a politics of interests that would be
weighed and could be accommodated in the legislative process-a process that, depending as it does on the necessity to
find or build majorities, fosters compromise and, therefore,
moderation-we now have a politics of rights, a politics that
44. In fact, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the provision. See
Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870

(1946) (No. 916).
45. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1981)).
46. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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excludes compromise and moderation. It is a zero-sum politics
with one winner. The wife gains a right to terminate a pregnancy, which leaves nothing for the husband who has an interest in becoming a father. Interests, as Madison pointed out in
The Federalist No. 10, had to be and, in his judgment, could be
regulated,5 ° but rights cannot be regulated, which is why interests, and not rights, are represented in the legislative process.
When the Court "creates" a right, it carves out a sanctuary for
a private activity, an area isolated and insulated from the law
and, therefore, from regulation.
But that is not all. By carving out these various sanctuaries-for Thelma Levy, 5 ' Fanny Hill, 52 Paul Cohen,5 3 and many
others-the Court has to strike down those state laws having to
do with legitimacy and illegitimacy and therefore the family,
with obscenity and pornography and therefore the family, with
public profanity and therefore civility and our ability to live
together in peace. In short, the Court has created a sanctuary
from the legal efforts of states to somehow preserve one of the
"normative bases of the United States Constitution."
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